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Abstract
This paper examines the impacts of China coal import tariff against US on global
economy and CO2 emissions. Using Global Trade Analysis Project Environmental
(GTAP-E) model, coal import tariff was found to generate trade deflection and
trade depression phenomena. Then, US and China’s would have welfare loss, but
Indonesia and Australia would seem gainers from this tariff war. Furthermore,
skilled and unskilled labor will decline in coal’s industry in US and increase in
China. Finally, it is also found evidence that China coal import tariff was not good
policy because not only the global economy, the environment would be
disadvantaged by increasing CO2.
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1. Introduction
China has long been a target of trade barriers, especially from US. It is
because the growth rate and the level of China's exports which increase
continuously and put pressure on the main export markets in North America and
Europe (Dong and Whalley, 2012). Concerns over the possibilities of trade
confrontations (Dong and Whalley, 2012) make bilateral trade retaliation between
United States (US) and China has long been observed by researchers, such as
Dong and Whalley (2012), Chandra and Long (2013), Chandra (2016), Rosyadi
and Widodo (2017).
Trade war between the two countries is increasingly worrying when Donald J.
Trump was elected as US’ 45th president because he included some controversial
trade protectionism plan in his campaign (Rosyadi and Widodo, 2017). As proof,
US imposed various import tariffs to China, one of them was implementation a 25
2percent tariif on 333 goods originating from China, including semiconductors,
chemicals, plastics, motorbikes and electric scooters (Wong and Koty, 2018). This
provoked China to implement tariff retaliation to US by imposing 25 percent tariff
on 333 goods from the US, including coal, copper scrap, fuel, buses and medical
equipment (Wong and Koty, 2018). Dong and Whalley (2012) predicted that
bilateral trade retaliation on tariff only would harm US and benefit China, but
Rosyadi and Widodo (2017) predicted tariff war would hurt both of them because
of welfare loss.
Imposing of China coal import tariff against US is possible not only having an
impact on welfare, but also on carbon dioxide (CO2) emissions because of strong
correlation between coal and CO2 emissions. China Power (2018) shows that
since 2004 China has had the world’s largest carbon footprint and was responsible
for 27.6 percent of global CO2 emissions in 2017 which about 70 percent of
China’s CO2 emissions results from coal. Anderson and McKibbin (2000) found
that subsidy and protectionism would improve CO2 emissions and removal both
of them would impact on greenhouse gas abatement. Limited research on the
impacts of coal import tariff on CO2 emissions motivates this paper to investigate
the impacts.
In this paper, I try examining the impacts of China coal import tariff not only
on global economy, but also on CO2 emissions. Using Global Trade Analysis
Project Environmental (GTAP-E) model, I find evidence of trade deflection
phenomena which China coal import tariff leads to decline in US coal export to
China and increase in US export to its third trading partners. Then, it also is found
3evidence of trade depression which US reduces import for similar product from its
trading partners. The second finding is tariff war between US-China is found to
generate a decline in welfare not only both of them, but also impact on their
trading partners. Indonesia and Australia seem gainers from this bilateral tariff
war, but India will has a welfare loss. Futhermore, skilled and unskilled labor will
decline in coal’s industry of US and increase in China. Finally, based on overall
evidences is concluded that China coal import tariff is not good policy because
not only the global economy, the environment will also be disadvantaged by
increasing CO2.
The rest of this paper is structured as follows. Section 2 presents several
previous studies. Section 3 describes the data, model, and scenario used in this
study. Then, results and discussion will be elaborated in Section 4. Finally,
Section 5 concludes.
2. Literature Review
Trade war between US and China has been observed by a number of previous
researchers, such as Rosyadi and Widodo (2017), Chandra (2016), Chandra and
Long (2013), and Dong and Whalley (2012). A large of previous literature tended
to focus on the impact of US trade barrier against China using import tariff,
temporary trade barriers (TTBs), and anti-dumping (AD). Rosyadi and Widodo
(2017) found that US import tariff led to a decrease in GDP and welfare for US
and China. However, different finding was generated by Dong and Whalley (2012)
who found that US-China bilateral trade retaliation caused an increase in China’s
welfare and decrease in US’ welfare. Tariff war was beneficial to China because it
4would reduce the trade surplus and then improve China’s welfare, but it was not a
good policy for the US (Dong and Whalley, 2012).
Impact of import tariff is not only observed for US-China, but also for the
other countries. Mahadevan et al. (2017) used a dynamic computable general
equilibrium model to examine the impact of protectionism (import tariff and
mineral export taxes) in Indonesia. They found that protectionism lead to a fall in
GDP growth caused by substantial decline in real household consumption
expenditure. Moreover, unilateral protectionism would enhance welfare gains in
the short run, but in the long run the gains would dissapear and the country would
be worse off (Chauvin and Ramos, 2013).
Using a standard computable general equilibrium model, Elsheikh et al. (2015)
proved that improving of wheat import tariff in Sudan had negative impact on its
imports, encouraged its domestic production for self-sufficiency with less
efficiency, and reduced GDP. Negative impact of trade barrier on import also was
found by Staiger and Wolak (1994). They used data in the United States over the
period 1980-1985 and found that imposed AD led to a reduction in import flow.
In addition to decline in import, trade restriction was also deflect exports
flows from countries imposed by tariff to third country market called “trade
deflection” (Rosyadi and Widodo, 2017; Chandra, 2016; Dong and Whalley, 2012;
Bown and Crowley, 2007; Prusa, 2001). Rosyadi and Widodo (2017) predicted
steep decline in bilateral trade between the two countries and increasing export
towards their third trading partners because of import tariff. The growth of
Chinese exports to other countries increased as US trade barriers was imposed to
5China (Chandra, 2016). Prusa (2001) indicated that countries were targeted with
the US AD duty had 30-50% decline in imports, but about one-third of the
decrease was substituted by an increase in imports from non-named countries.
Dong and Whalley (2012) used a conventional Armington trade model with
five regions, the US, China, EU, Japan, and the Rest of the World to analyze
potential consequences of US-China bilateral retaliation. They suggested as the
bilateral tariff rates are very high, EU and Japan would seem gainers from
preferential access to US and Chinese markets. Similarly, imposition of a US AD
duty led to a 5-7% average increase in Japanese exports to a non-US trading
partner (Bown and Crowley, 2007). Trade deflection improved exports to the
existing third country markets and decreased to newer and more volatile markets
(Chandra, 2016).
Actually, not only trade deflection, Bown and Crowley (2007) also found
trade depression phenomena. As the output produced by firms in country i could
not be sold in the US, but was sold domestically, they suggested it crowded out
country i’s imports of the same product from Japan. They indicated an average 5-
19% decline in Japanese exports to the third country in the same product category.
On the other hand, Chandra (2016) did not find any evidence of trade depression.
Futhermore, trade restriction was indicated to impact productivity (Chandra
and Long, 2013; Li and Whalley, 2015). Chandra and Long (2013) showed that
US AD duties led to a substantial decrease in the productivity of Chinese
exporting firms. They evidenced less benefit from economy of scale caused AD
lowered output level and thus reduced firms’ productvity (Chandra and Long,
62013). They also concluded firms that had higher initial export intensity before
the imposition of the AD duty were most affected for these effects, while new
exporters would have positive impacts..
Otherwise, using dynamic system GMM estimator and industrial panel data,
Li and Whalley (2015) found that AD actions by developed and developing
countries improved labour productivity. They argued that a Chinese industry or
the firm may reach in various ways as faced with an AD measures; refocusing
production on domestic markets, increased exports to other countries, producing
something else, fighting the action, or close down production an exit the market.
Moreover, they suggested improvement of labour productivity were due to firms
decreased their prices and profits, reduced employment to lower costs, but try to
maintain exports and output as faced AD, so as negative impact on employees
larger than on output.
Most of the above papers examine impact of trade restriction on global
economy, none of them explore impact on CO2 emissions. In fact, trade is
mechanism to move goods and service produced in one place to be consumed in
another place (Ekins et al., 1994). If export commodities are produced in more
non-environmentally friendly way than commodities destined for domestic
consumption, then producing accommodate for trade may increase environmental
damage (DeBellevue et al., 1994; R pke, 1994 in Ekins et al., 1994). On the other
hand, the proponents of free trade argues that free trade protects the environment
through economic growth that will increases the demand for environmental
7protection and provides the resources necessary for it (GATT, 1992 in Ekins et al.,
1994).
Impact of trade barrier on emissions has been tried examining by Anderson
and McKibbin (2000). Anderson and McKibbin (2000) used a simple theoretical
partial equilibrium approach and the turn to some empirical results (using G-
Cubed) to investigate impact of trade barriers and reducing coal subsidies on
greenhouse gas abatement. They observed that with the help of coal trade barriers,
several industrial countries applied coal mining subsidies and many developing
and former socialist countries applied coal burning subsidies, which coal mining
and coal burning are pollute. They found that removed distortions to coal markets
in developing and transition economies and removed production subsidies in the
OECD could potentially reduce global emissions of carbon dioxide.
Emission reduction could also be done through coal consumption restrictions,
such as found by Riker (2012) and Barbe (2017). Riker (2012) argued countries
would have abundant coal production capacity if reduce their coal consumption.
The abundant coal production capacity would impact on domestic consumption,
export, and then CO2 emissions. Therefore, Riker (2012) tried analyzing impact of
restrictions coal consumption in the US and several other large countries on global
coal consumption, trade, and industry employment. Using an econometric model
to annual data panel that include 53 countries period 1999-2008, they found a
decrease in CO2 emissions was due to coal consumption restriction decreased US
consumption. They also found a decline in US consumption caused increase in US
coal exports, and thus increase in coal consumption in countries that did not
8participate. Futhermore, the coal consumption restriction would reduce US coal
industry employment.
The similar finding found by Barbe (2017) who used a modified version of the
GTAP-E model to stimulate the impact of US coal consumption restrictions. He
argued that coal consumption restriction in one country would incentive the
export of coal to non-abating foreign countries and improve coal consuming
industries to move their production to these countries. Although they found a
negligible effect on foreign emissions, but restriction on coal consumption in the
US had a substantial effect on foreign welfare.
3. Methodology
3.1. Database
The GTAP-E model and version 9 of the GTAP database are implemented to
simulate the impacts of China coal import tariff. The benchmark year used in
database version 9 is 2011 including 140 regions, 57 sectors, and 8 factors of
production (Aguiar et al., 2016). Moreover, bilateral trade in goods and services,
intermediate inputs among sectors, and taxes and subsidies imposed by
governments are included in database (Aguiar et al., 2016).
3.2. Model
The GTAP model is a multi-region multi-sector comparative static
computable general equilibrium (CGE) model of the world economy (Barbe,
2017). Established in 1992, GTAP presented conducting quantitative analyses of
international economic issues in an economy wide framework (Hertel, 1997).
9Futhermore, the GTAP-E model is the approach implemented as an extended
version of the GTAP that associates carbon emissions from the combustion of
fossil fuels and a mechanism to trade these emissions internationally (Burniaux
and Truong, 2002).
This implementation of GTAP-E was aggregated to 8 sectors. Coal, oil,
electricity, and petroleum and coal products were mapped into 1-to-1 mapping,
while the other were mapped into groups, such as natural gas extraction, energy
intensive industries, etc (see Appendix for details). To see trade deflection
phenomena, the countries were mapped into 1-to-1 mapping for country with top
suppliers coal import into China and top destination of US coal exports, such as
Australia, Indonesia, United States, Mongolia, etc (see Appendix for details).
Then, the rest were mapped into some groups, such as Oceania, East Asia,
Southeast Asia, South Asia, North America, Latin America, European Union 28,
Middle East and North Africa, Sub-Saharan Africa, and rest of world. Finally,
factors of production were mapped into some category, such as land, skilled labor,
unskilled labor, capital, and natural resources (see Appendix for details).
After agggregation, the next step was simulation to get final solution. Both
GTAP-E database and GTAP-E model were run using RunGTAP 3.6.9.0 and
GEMPACK software. To provide maximum result accuracy, Gragg’s 4-6-8 steps
solution method with automatic accuracy was used (Horridge, 2001 in Rosyadi
and Widodo, 2017).
3.3. Scenario
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Before conducting simulation, the scenario must be determined first. The
chosen scenario is China’s decision to impose 25 percent import tariff on 333
goods from United States, one of the commodities is coal. This was done in
retaliation for the action previously taken by United States. With scenario focus
on coal import tariff, the model will be run to investigate the impacts on global
economy and CO2 emissions.
4. Results and Discussions
China coal import tariff has impact not only on US-China bilateral trade, but
also on global trade. The impact on global trade is summarized in Table 1. The
result implies that with imposing China import tariff to US, bilateral trade
between US-China leads to a 73.9% decline in US export to China and China
import from US. The decrease in US export causes US has a coal stock surplus
and therefore US has to divert this excess stock to US’ third trading partners. This
phenomena is called trade diversion. This finding is in line with Rosyadi and
Widodo (2017), Chandra (2016), Dong and Whalley (2012), Bown and Crowley
(2007), and Prusa (2001).
Similar with Bown and Crowley (2007), Table 1 also shows phenomena called
trade depression. There is a coal stock surplus not only makes US has to deflect
their trade, but also sells the surplus domestically. Hence, US has to reduce its
import for similar product. However, this phenomena is not supported by Chandra
(2016).
Table 1. Coal Export and Import (in percentage change)
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Source: GTAP-E model simulation output (2018), processed
Futhermore, this study also examines impact import tariff on welfare. Based
on Table 2 is noted that trade barrier between US-China only makes both of them
lose their welfare, supported by Rosyadi and Widodo’s finding (2017). Trade
barrier leads to a US $ 43.98 million decrease in China’s welfare and US $ 111.02
million decrease in US’ welfare. Even though causes welfare loss, actually China
coal import tariff generates welfare gain for its third trading partners, such as
Indonesia (US $ 25.43 million increase in welfare) and Australia (US $ 17.04
million increase in welfare). Through World’s Top Exports site, Workman (2018)
Region China Export US Export China Import US Import
China 1.104 -73.924 1.104 -0.155
US -0.155 0.178 -73.924 0.178
Australia -0.032 0.285 1.122 -0.147
Indonesia 0.072 0.406 1.016 -0.238
Russia -0.138 0.182 1.153 -0.119
Mongolia 0.272 0.607 0.364 -0.978
Canada -0.171 0.140 1.151 -0.118
Korea -0.004 0.305 1.178 -0.092
New Zealand -0.014 0.327 1.120 -0.155
Vietnam 0.034 0.371 1.055 -0.227
Malaysia 0.036 0.369 1.162 -0.103
Iran -0.053 0.289 1.077 -0.191
Kyrgyzstan -0.087 0.256 1.190 -0.079
Laos 0.014 0.358 1.150 -0.119
Germany -0.136 0.193 1.197 -0.073
UK -0.085 0.244 1.191 -0.079
India -0.007 0.301 1.180 -0.090
Netherlands -0.065 0.260 1.194 -0.075
Japan -0.008 0.299 1.176 -0.094
Brazil -0.140 0.179 1.198 -0.072
Oceania -0.022 0.288 1.181 -0.088
EastAsia 0.037 0.364 0.968 -0.323
SEAsia 0.053 0.370 1.137 -0.132
SouthAsia -0.013 0.330 1.176 -0.093
NAmerica -0.097 0.219 1.195 -0.074
LatinAmerica -0.096 0.220 1.187 -0.082
EU 28 -0.082 0.241 1.191 -0.078
MENA -0.117 0.202 1.194 -0.076
SSA -0.046 0.273 1.146 -0.133
Rest of World -0.110 0.222 1.193 -0.077
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shows that Australia and Indonesia are the top coal suppliers to China with import
value of US $ 9.8 billion (Australia) and $ 2.5 billion (Indonesia). On the other
hand, the top destination of US coal export with shares of total coal export in 2017
of 11.8% (US Energy Information Administration, 2018), India gets welfare loss
of US $ 4.6 million.
Table 2. Equivalent Variation (in $ US million)
Source: GTAP-E model simulation output (2018), processed
Region EV
China -43.979
US -111.023
Australia 17.042
Indonesia 25.433
Russia 2.749
Mongolia 9.015
Canada 6.607
Korea -2.258
New Zealand 0.123
Vietnam 2.970
Malaysia -0.585
Iran 0.399
Kyrgyzstan -0.032
Laos 0.008
Germany 4.033
UK 0.831
India -4.605
Netherlands 0.589
Japan -3.070
Brazil 2.936
Oceania -0.110
EastAsia 0.373
SEAsia -1.008
SouthAsia -0.734
NAmerica 2.015
LatinAmerica 3.465
EU 28 2.863
MENA 5.253
SSA 2.969
Rest of World 2.378
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As Dong and Whalley (2012), this result suggests that bilateral trade
retaliation on tariff will harm US. Not only gets higher welfare loss, US also will
lose coal’s industry labor. Table 3 shows US’ skilled and unskilled labor of coal’s
industry will decrease by 0.676%. Otherwise, China’s skilled labor of coal’s
industry will increase by 0.195 % and unskilled labor increase by 0.189%.
Table 3. Demand for Coal’s Industry Labor (in percentage change)
Region Skilled Labor Unskilled Labor
China 0.195 0.189
US -0.676 -0.676
Source: GTAP-E model simulation output (2018), processed
Unlike the impacts on the global economy, the impact China coal import tariff
on carbon dioxide emissions is less obvious (Table 4). Although only small
percentage, import tariff leads to an 0.033% increase in China’s CO2 and 0.007%
increase in US’ CO2. A rise of CO2 is in accordance with finding from Anderson
and McKibbin (2000) who found that government distortions (subsidies and
import tariff) to the world’s coal market increased global emissions of carbon
dioxide.
5. Conclusion
Based on the results of this paper it can be concluded that China coal import
tariff againts US is not a good policy. It is because not only detrimental to the
global economy, but also to the environment. China coal import tariff leads to
decline in US and China’s welfare. US will get more hurt because of a decline in
labor while China will experience an increase in labor. Then, imposing import
tariff will also impact on US and China’s trading partners. Through trade
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deflection and trade depression phenomena, Indonesia and Australia will has
welfare gain, but India will has welfare loss. The worst side is US and China will
have an increase in carbon dioxide emissions due to this policy.
Table 4. Carbon Dioxide Emissions (in percentage change)
Source: GTAP-E model simulation output (2018), processed
However, this study has some limitations. First, the benchmark year of
database used in this model based on 2011. It can lead the biased results which
trade deflection and depression cannot be drawn obviously: we do not know who
is the gainers and the losers. Second, China coal import tariff is not the right
Region CO2
China 0.033
US 0.007
Australia -0.001
Indonesia -0.009
Russia -0.000
Mongolia 0.009
Canada -0.001
Korea -0.003
New Zealand -0.001
Vietnam -0.010
Malaysia -0.003
Iran 0.000
Kyrgyzstan -0.000
Laos 0.001
Germany 0.001
UK -0.000
India 0.006
Netherlands -0.000
Japan -0.002
Brazil 0.000
Oceania 0.000
EastAsia -0.009
SEAsia -0.002
SouthAsia -0.001
NAmerica 0.000
LatinAmerica 0.000
EU 28 -0.000
MENA 0.000
SSA -0.003
Rest of World 0.000
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policy if it is intended to reduce coal consumption and is expected to reduce
carbon dioxide emissions. If the country wants to reduce carbon dioxide emissions,
the right policy is through coal consumption restrictions, as has been done Barbe
(2017). Futhermore, the country can remove the import tariff with an optimal
consumption tax to get optimal carbon dioxide emissions reduction, as suggested
by Anderson and McKibbin (2000).
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Appendix
Regional Aggregation Mapping
Regions Members
China China
Australia Australia
Indonesia Indonesia
Russia Russian Federation
Mongolia Mongolia
Canada Canada
US US
Korea Korea
NewZealand NewZealand
Vietnam Vietnam
Malaysia Malaysia
Iran Iran
Kyrgyzstan Kyrgyzstan
Laos Laos
Germany Germany
UK UK
India India
Netherlands Netherlands
Japan Japan
Brazil Brazil
Oceania Rest of Oceania
EastAsia Hong Kong, Taiwan, Rest of East Asia
SEAsia Brunei Darassalam, Cambodia, Philippines, Singapore, Thailand, Rest of
Southeast Asia
SouthAsia Bangladesh, Nepal, Pakistan, Sri Lanka, Rest of South Asia
NAmerica Mexico, Rest of North America
LatinAmer Argentina, Bolivia, Chile, Colombia, Ecuador, Paraguay, Peru, Uruguay,
Venezuela, Rest of South America, Costa Rica, Guatemala, Honduras,
Nicaragua, Panama, El Salvador, Rest of Central America, Dominican
Republic, Jamaica, Puerto Rico, Trinidad and Tobago, Caribbean
EU_28 Austria, Belgium, Cyprus, Czech Republic, Denmark, Estonia, Finland,
France, Greece, Hungary, Ireland, Italy, Latvia, Lithuania, Luxembourg,
Malta, Poland, Portugal, Slovakia, Slovenia, Spain, Sweden, Bulgaria,
Croatia, Romania
MENA Bahrain, Israel, Jordhan, Kuwait, Oman, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, Turkey,
United Arab Emirates, Rest of Western Asia, Egypt, Morocco, Tunisia, Rest
of North Africa
SSA Benin, Burkina Faso, Cameroon, Cote d’Ivoire, Ghana, Guinea, Nigeria,
Senegal, Togo, Rest of Western Africa, Central Africa, South Central Africa,
Ethiopia, Kenya, Madagascar, Malawi, Mauritius, Mozambiwue, Rwanda,
Tanzania, Uganda, Zambia, Zimbabwe, Rest of Eastern Africa, Botswana,
Namibia, South Africa, Rest of South African Customs
Restofworld Switxerland, Norway, Rest of EFTA, Albania, Belarus, Ukraine, Rest of
Eastern Europe, Rest of Europe, Kazakhstan, Rest of Former Soviet Union,
Armenia, Azerbaijan, Georgia, Rest of the World
Source: Author’s specification from GTAP 9 Database
Sector Aggregation Mapping
Aggregation
Name
Group Description GTAP
Code
Disaggregated Sectors
Coal Coal mining coa Coal
Oil Crude oil oil Oil
Oil_pcts Refined oil products p_c Petroleum, coal products
Gas Natural gas
extraction
gas
gdt
Gas
Gas manufacture, distribution
Electricity Electricity ely Electricity
En_Int_ind Energy intensive
industries
omn
crp
nmm
i_s
nfm
Minerals nec
Chemical, rubber, plastic prods
Mineral products nec
Ferrous metals
Metals nec
Agr Primary agriculture,
forestry, and fishing
pdr
wht
gro
v_f
osd
c_b
pfb
ocr
ctl
oap
rmk
wol
frs
fsh
Paddy rice
Wheat
Cereal grains nec
Vegetables, fruits, nuts
Oil seeds
Sugar cane, sugar beet
Plant-based fibers
Crops nec
Cattle, sheep, goats, horses
Animal products nec
Raw milk
Wool, silk-worm cocoons
Forestry
Fishing
Oth_ind_ser Other industries and
other services sector
cmt
omt
vol
mil
pcr
sgr
ofd
b_t
tex
wap
lea
lum
ppp
fmp
mvh
otn
ele
ome
omf
wtr
cns
trd
otp
wtp
atp
cmn
Meat: cattle, sheep, goats, horse
Meat products nec
Vegeable oils and fats
Dairy products
Processed rice
Sugar
Food products nec
Beverages and tobacco products
Textiles
Wearin apparel
Leather products
Wood products
Paper products, publishing
Metal products
Motor vehicles and parts
Transport equipment nec
Electronic equipment
Machinery and equipment nec
Manufactures nec
Water
Construction
Trade
Transport nec
Sea transport
Air transport
Communication
ofi
isr
obs
ros
osg
dwe
Financial services nec
Insurance
Business services nec
Recreation and other services
PubAdmin/Defence/Health/Education
Dwellings
Source: Author’s specification from GTAP 9 Database
Factors of Production Aggregation Mapping
Factor of Production Aggregation Group Factor Mobility
Land “Land” Sluggish
(ETRAE = -1)
Technicians, Associates,
Professionals Officials and
Managers
Skilled Labor
“SkLabor”
Mobile
Agricultural and Unskilled
Clerks Service/ Shop Workers
Unskilled Labor
“UnSkLabor”
Mobile
Capital “Capital” Sluggish
(ETRAE = -1)
Natural Resources Natural Resources
“Natres”
Sluggish
(ETRAE = -0.001)
Source: Author’s specification from GTAP 9 Database
